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ABSTRAK
Keterlibatan Uni Eropa (UE) dalam Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) merupakan salah satu cerita sukses dalam 
penyelesaian konflik secara damai. Dalam misi ini, UE mampu menunjukkan kepada dunia bahwa mereka merupakan 
salah satu aktor signifikan dalam politik internasional. Harus diakui bahwa UE merepresentasikan uncertain image 
(gambaran yang kurang jelas) dalam politik internasional yang tingkatannya tidak dapat disejajarkan dengan 
negara-bangsa. Artikel ini menganalisis apakah UE memainkan peran signifikan sebagai aktor internasional dalam 
proses perdamaian di Aceh melalui pendalaman terhadap kerja AMM. Dengan memandang UE sebagai entitas 
yang terlibat dalam isu-isu khusus dan dengan menekankan pada kehadiran UE di kancah internasional melalui 
keterlibatannya dalam AMM, maka dapat disimpulkan bahwa UE memainkan peran siginifikan sebagai aktor 
internasional.
Kata kunci: Uni Eropa, aktor internasional, Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)
ABSTRACT
The European Union (EU) involvement in the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) was one of the successful story in 
the peaceful conflict settlement. In this mission, the EU has been able to show the world that it is one of significant 
actor in international politics. Admittedly, the EU represents uncertain image in international politics as if it can 
not be seen at the same level of sovereign-states. This article examines whether the EU played a significant role as 
an international actor in the peace process in Aceh through an indepth-look at the work of  the AMM. By viewing 
the EU as an evolving entity which engaged in particular issues and by addressing its international presence in the 
context of its involvement in the AMM, it can be concluded the EU has played significant role as an international 
actor. 
Keywords: the European Union, international actor, the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), Gerakan Aceh 
Merdeka (GAM)
INTRODUCTION
After three decades of conflict, the 
Indonesian government and the Free Aceh 
Movement or Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) 
which was fighting for an Aceh independent 
state eventually agreed to end the conflict by 
signing the Memorandum of Understanding on 
August 15, 2005. The agreement, henceforth 
Helsinki Accord, was facilitated by the Crisis 
Management Initiative chaired by former Finnish 
President, Martti Ahtisaari, with the support of 
the European Union (EU). In this peace process, 
the EU played a key role in fostering the Helsinki 
Accord, by supervising the implementation of 
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the agreement. The EU also led a peacekeeping 
mission, the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) 
from 15 September 2005 until 15 December 2006 
in cooperation with some of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) member states. 
This mission regards as a watchdog to ensure the 
peace process in Aceh. 
This paper will critically examine whether 
the EU played a significant role as an international 
actor in the peace process in Aceh through an 
indepth-look at the work of  the AMM. I will argue 
that the EU played a key role as an international 
actor in the AMM. This paper will be divided into 
three sections. The first section will examine the 
debate over the EU as an international actor. The 
second section will show the Aceh conflict as the 
background understanding of the peace process. 
The third section will examine the work of the 
EU through the AMM and its challenges. 
The EU as an International 
Actor: the DebateTHE EU AS AN 
INTERNATIONAL ACTOR: 
THE DEBATE
In contemporary world affairs, the EU 
presents a puzzling feature. According to 
McCormick (2005, 208), the EU is more than 
an international organization but less than a 
state and this feature often frustrated other 
international actors, whether they should think 
of 27 member states or regards as a single 
entity. The EU member states still maintain their 
sovereignty in many areas, such as defence and 
security issues. However, in particular issues, 
such as trade negotiations, other parties should 
deal with the EU because of member states 
willingness in allowing the EU Commission as 
the representative of their interest (McCormick, 
2005, 108).
There are some challenges to assess the 
role of the EU in global politics. Caporaso et.al., 
(1998, 213) argues that the analytical criteria to 
determine the status of the EU as an actor are 
not clear. It is hardly to find consensus about 
the meaning of the actor where the existing 
standards mainly discussed about power and 
influence. Furthermore, he argues that the 
changing nature of the EU is a challenge. It is 
an organization made up of 27 member states 
and several institutions which replicate territorial 
and nonterritorial interests. Moreover, EU’s 
involvement in world affairs are varies over time 
and issues (Caporaso, 1998, 213).
Caporaso, et.al (1998, 214), outline three 
characteristic to analyse the “actorhood” of the 
EU. First, the EU can be seen as a collection 
of states with limited set of rules to direct the 
interactions among member states. The status 
of the EU as a “collective actor” relates to 
its convergence of interests at the unit level 
facilitated by interaction within a communication 
structure. Second, the EU regards as an evolving 
polity. Based on this idea, there has been a political 
transition within the EU from nation-state system 
into a polity. This approach, however, ignores the 
process of system transformation itself. Third, the 
EU view as an evolving entity made up of several 
issue areas and policy networks with varieties of 
“actorhood” across time and issues (Caporaso, 
1998, 214). In this regards, the third characteristic 
will be used in later discussion about the EU’s 
actorness in global politics. 
According to Caporaso, et.al., (1998, 214-
220) there are four components of actor capacity in 
global politics : recognition, authority, autonomy, 
and cohesion. First factor, is recognition by 
other actors, whether de jure or de facto, which 
accept and allows for presence in global politics. 
De jure recognition is diplomatic recognition 
under international law or formal membership 
in international organizations. Because of the 
EU is not sovereign, therefore, the EU does 
not have a full diplomatic recognition from 
third parties. Although the EU has high-level 
diplomatic contacts with almost every country 
in the world, it has not been granted the exact 
status as sovereign states. 
By the same token, in international 
organizations memberships, the EU often 
confused third parties due to its unclear position 
whether it is competent enough to address any 
given issues and endorse responsibilities as 
a member of the international organizations. 
As a consequence, third parties does not grant 
full recognition to the EU through formal 
international organizationmembership. De facto 
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recognition can be seen from the sociality of 
global politics. The interaction between third 
parties and the EU can be regarded as an implicit 
recognition upon it (Caporaso, 1998, 216).
 The second factor is the EU’s authority 
to act externally. Due to the fact that the EU is a 
creation of the member states, thus the authority 
derives from these states. In this regard, the 
authority is assigned to EU institutions by 
sovereign nation-states. The third factor is 
autonomy, which suggest independency from 
other state actors. Independence in this sense 
means that these institutions should work 
differently and independently from the basic 
expectation of a normal states system operating 
on the basis of power and interests. The fourth 
factor, is cohesion, to which the ability of 
actor to formulate and articulate consistent 
policy preferences. However, the EU can make 
a difference even without policy cohesion 
(Caporaso, 1998, 217). 
In a slightly different way, Mackenstein 
et.al, (2005, 261-262) outline four factors to 
analyse the EU’s direction and capabilities as an 
international actor : legitimacy, the transatlantic 
context, the enlargement, and the attitudes of 
member states. The legitimacy discussions 
include the impact of international law and the 
relationship between the EU and its citizens. 
International crises such as in Kosovo, September 
11 and Iraq provide challenges to international 
law and implies recognition that the EU should 
response effectively to these crises. 
Because of the role of the EU is very 
limited therefore the EU should increase its 
power to provide greater accountability in the 
EU external relations. The transatlantic context, 
in this regard, discuss the conduct of the EU 
as an international actor. The enlargement of 
the EU is also crucial factor, which include the 
pending 2004 round and future obligations, 
such as those taken on the SAP. New external 
relations challenges ranging from migration and 
new environmental threats through to strive for 
adapting the European security architecture and 
avoid outlining new dividing lines around EU 
frontiers (Mackenstein, 2005, 261).
Nevertheless, they argue that the most 
critical factor of all is the attitudes of its member 
states. In this regard, the significant factors will 
be how good and how bad the leading member 
states coordinate and cooperate with one another. 
For example, the Anglo-French rapprochement in 
the St Malo declaration was the most significant 
factor for the development of the EU’s security 
ambitions and capabilities from late 1990s. 
On the contrary, there is a significant loss of 
momentum in the Iraq crisis due to the aligning 
of Franco-German against British, Spain, and 
Italy (Mackenstein, 2005, 261).  
Furthermore, they argue that the most 
important factor of all is political will, especially, 
the willingness of other international actor to 
recognize the EU as a legitimate international 
actor. And more important is the political will of 
the EU member states. In order to be an effective 
international actors and to be able to reverse its 
international presence into operational power, 
the EU need to have a common will, a common 
vision and trust. The common vision of the EU 
is lacking of broad principles and objectives, and 
there has been a political will deficit and lack of 
trust. As a consequence, the EU seems to present 
uncertainty feature as an international actor. It 
will consistently set apart in economic, politico-
strategic and geographic reach. Its international 
ambitions and credibility will depend on the 
international events and there seems to be a 
contradictory in order to meet the rethorical 
commitments and political will (Mackenstein, 
2005, 262). 
According to Vogler, et.al. (1999, 5), there 
are three categories to examine the external 
roles of the EU : presence, opportunity, and 
capability. Presence refers to the relationship 
between internal development of the EU and 
external expectations. Opportunity refers to 
factors in external developments that could 
enable and constrain actorness. Capability 
refers to the capacity to respond effectively 
to external expectations and opportunities. 
Following Allen and Smith rationale, the EU’s 
presence in international affairs has been 
significance. Presence, in this sense, refers to 
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the ability to influence; to shape the perceptions 
and expectations of others. Presence was not 
supposed to be an external action, but rather as 
a consequence of internal policies and processes 
(Vogler, 1999, 6).   
By outlining from these point of view, the 
next section will discuss a case study about the 
EU’s role as an international actor in the Aceh 
Monitoring Mission.
THE ACEH CONFLICT
The roots of the Aceh conflict date back a 
long way. In October 1976 a separatist movement 
was created in the Indonesian province of 
Aceh on the island of Sumatra. This movement 
fought by GAM, strive to establish an Acehnese 
independent state. In the Indonesian history, 
there seems to be a paradox regarding to the 
fact that unlike the two other territories which 
created separatist movement, such as East Timor 
and West Papua, Aceh had contributed to the 
Indonesian nationalist movement and the creation 
of the IndonesianRepublic. There is a broad 
consensus in Indonesian society, especially in 
Acehnese society that the Acehnese embodied 
Islamic values in a country which comprised 
88% of Muslim population, and widely known 
as “Serambi Mekah” or “the Veranda of Mecca”. 
By drawing upon Acehnese dissatisfaction 
toward the government,GAM created a separatist 
movement. The 1976 GAM operation failed 
to mobilize Acehnese grievances and by 1979 
GAM was paralyzed by Indonesian military 
operations. In 1989, GAM was able to begun 
its military operations. For about sixteen years, 
GAM was involved in the insurgency against the 
Indonesian army. The crucial dissatisfaction lies 
in the vertical conflict of centre-periphery led to 
a political, social, and economic grievances. The 
Acehnese grievances related to the unfulfilled 
promises of autonomy by the central government 
under Soekarno (1951 – 1959) and under 
Soeharto (1967 – 1998). The grievances become 
intensified in 1971 by the discovery of natural 
gas. Especially, under Soeharto, the revenue of 
Aceh’s natural resources flowed to Jakarta with 
small amount of wealth return to the province 
(Schulze, 2007, 2). 
Furthermore, the population also felt 
discontent to the effects of the natural gas 
discovery, such as dispossession, dislocation, 
industrialization, pollution, foreign corporations, 
urban-rural migration, the arrival of non-
Acehnese workers and enclave development in 
North Aceh. This led to the risen of prices and 
urban poverty. The harder grievances felt by 
Acehnese was the Indonesian military operation 
from 1976, particularly in the period from 1989 
to 1998 when Aceh known as Daerah Operasi 
Militer (DOM) or military operations area. 
During this period, the Indonesian army in order 
to pursue GAM, committed with human rights 
abuses towards Aceh population (Schulze, 2007, 
2).
An opportunity for a peaceful settlement 
emerged by the changing of power in  Indonesian 
civilian and military power after the fall of 
Soeharto in 1998. Before that, the Indonesian 
government was consistent to use military 
approach in dealing with conflicts within the 
republic. However, the tsunami disaster on 
December 2004 contributed to the shifting 
political approach in dealing with conflict in 
Aceh, especially under President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono. The involvement of the EU through 
the Crisis Management Initiative chaired by 
Martti Ahtisaari contributed much to bringing 
the peaceful settlement to a successful outcome 
in July 2005. 
THE ACEH MONITORING MISSION 
(AMM) 
As a response to the official invitation by 
the Indonesian Government and supported by the 
GAM leadership, and despite initial doubts among 
some member states, the EU eventually decided 
to conduct its first mission in Asia. Learning from 
the past experience in East Timor, the Indonesian 
Government preferred a regional organization 
rather than the United Nations’ involvement 
and eventually the EU was a reasonable choice 
as if no Asian regional organizations capable to 
conduct such operation. The AMM was deployed 
on 15 September as an EU mission conducted 
together with five ASEAN countries (Brunei, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand), 
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and with contributions from Norway and 
Switzerland. It was led by the head of mission, 
Pieter Feith, whoreported to the European 
Council and directly to SecretaryGeneral Javier 
Solana(Helly, 2005).
From 15 Septemberto 31 December the 
AMM had 125 EU and 93 ASEANmonitors 
on the ground. At the end of the missionthere 
were only 29 EU and 7 ASEAN monitors left.
The AMM’s objective was to assist GAM 
and theIndonesian government with the 
implementation ofthe MOU and ‘to contribute 
to a peaceful, comprehensiveand sustainable 
solution to the conflict in Aceh’1. 
The AMM specific tasks were to:
• to monitor the demobilisation of GAM and 
thedecommissioning of its weapons
• to monitor the redeployment of non-
organic TNI and police
• to monitor the reintegration of GAM and 
the human rights situation as well as the 
legislativechange
•  to rule on disputed amnesty cases
•  and to investigate violations of the MOU
According to Schulze (2007, 4), the key to 
the success of the AMM were the Commission 
on Security Arrangements (COSA) meetings, 
head by Pieter Feith and attended by senior 
representatives of GAM and the Indonesian 
government, police and military. In addition, 
there were also meetings at the district level 
(DiCOSA). The purpose of these meetings was to 
provide a forum that could accommodate issues, 
questions, and complaints and resolve them 
before they turn to be real problems. 
THE EU INVOLVEMENT IN THE AMM 
The EU initiative and full support through 
the CMI is essential for the success of the 
Helsinki Accord. Its initiative also supported by 
some EU member states which sent their team 
in the AMM to show their strong commitment 
to the implementation of the Accord. Actually, 
the Helsinki Accord was the third attempts 
1 Aceh Monitoring Mission leaflet, Banda Aceh, 2006.
which involve international mediation to solve 
the conflicts in the region. The first peace 
negotiations were facilitated by the Centre for 
Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC) that produced the 
‘Joint Understanding on Humanitarian Pause for 
Aceh’ of12 May 2000. 
The second negotiation produced the 
‘Cessation of Hostilities Agreement’ (COHA) of9 
December 2002. Unfortunately, both negotiations 
were failed to end the conflict. Unlike the 
previous accords facilitated by the HDC, the 
Helsinki Accord facilitated by the CMI had 
full support from the EU in legal and financial 
basis. The legal basis of the CMI found in the 
‘Council Regulation No. 381/2001 establishing 
the Rapid Reaction Mechanism’ orRRM. The 
initiative legal basis found in the EU’s ‘RRM 
Policy Advice and Mediation Facility Decision 
2002–2004.’ It can be argued that the quasi-
state was thesole international mediator during 
the negotiations that end up in the Helsinki 
Accord(Gunaryadi, 2006, 89).
After five rounds of tough negotiations 
between January and July 2005, the Indonesian 
government and GAM eventually agreed on the 
Helsinki Accord. Aspinall (2005) emphasizes 
that the possibility for success of this accord 
is greater than the previous peace accords 
because it is different in fundamental way. The 
previous accords, such as The Humanitarian 
Pause for Aceh andCOHA, called for ceasefires 
and demilitarization which followed by an 
openendeddialogue on the political status of 
Aceh. Both parties remained in a different 
stand on the core issue of whether Aceh should 
become an independent state or remain part of 
the Indonesian republic. 
On this critical circumstances, it was very 
difficult for both parties to build confidence and 
trust one another. Especially Indonesian military 
and government remained suspicious that the 
peace accords was used by GAM to strengthen its 
separatist movement However, the negotiations 
become possible to be successful after GAM 
announced in February that they were willing to 
leave behind its independence goal and agreed 
to accept a “self-government” solution for Aceh 
within the Indonesian state (Aspinall, 2005, 
viii).   
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Furthermore, Aspinall (2005, viii) notes 
that compare to the previous accords, the 
Helsinki Accord outlinesa comprehensive 
peace settlement. It deals not only with security 
dimension but also with broad terms such as a 
new political relationship between Aceh and the 
Indonesian state which is personified in a new 
Law on the Governing of Aceh. The Helsinki 
Accord also includes requirementsconcerning 
political participation, human rights, the rule of 
law, andeconomic matters as well as measures 
for the disarmament of GAM andits members’ 
reintegration into society. Indeed, with the 
involvement of the EU in Aceh Monitoring 
Mission and also supported by participating 
countries from ASEAN, the Helsinki Accord 
is more successful than the previous accords. 
The EU backstage roles in the process is 
significant in spite of Indonesia’s sensitivity to 
foreign intervention on its domestic affairs. The 
important thing then begin with the question why 
the EU took the lead in the process, compare to 
other organizations. To answer the question, it 
would be better to analyse the EU motivations.
THE EU MOTIVATIONS
Following Gunaryadi (2006, 92), the EU 
main motivations to take the lead of the Helsinki 
Accord are the political; and geopolitical and 
strategical considerations. From the political 
motive, there are three points need to be concerns. 
First, it can be said that the EU has ambition to be 
a global player where it requires ‘to lead, not to be 
led’ (Suryadinata, 1997). This ambition is natural 
in away of its appearance as an international 
actor and the pursuit of its global interest. He 
mentions several factors that endorse the EU as 
an international actor. 
The most important factor is the EU has 
become a global power in terms of economic, 
tradeand investment. It contributed 51% of 
world’s foreign direct investment outflows. It is 
the biggest and richest marketplace in the world 
with more than 454 million consumers, its exports 
of goods and services constituted 38% of the 
world market, controlled of 36% of the world’s 
GNP, provided 56% of official development 
assistance. Furthermore, the EU Member States 
build the largest block in the Bretton Wood 
institutions : 23% of the votes in theWorld 
Bankand 29% of the votes in the International 
Monetary Fund, it possesses the largestcollective 
number of votes as well as a regional grouping in 
the World TradeOrganisation(Van Reisen, 1999, 
2). Moreover, the EU will remain influential 
in the global economy as the euro become 
established and become powerful competitor to 
the US dollar and the Japanese Yen. 
The EU ‘actorness,’ is still debatable 
because it was usually referred to the role of 
a sovereign state, a level that would be hard 
toachieved by the EU. Thus, the concept of 
the ‘actorness’ should be go along with the 
notion of its international presence. The notion 
of ‘presence’ itself would compensate the 
EU’s inability to exercise it effectively in the 
pursuit of its global interests (Peterson, 1998, 
3). The notion of ‘presence’ might become a 
more significant phenomenon that attract the 
perceptions and expectations of policy-makers in 
the international politics (Allen& Smith, 1991, 
95-120). According to C. Hill (1994, 103-126) 
there are three capabilities underlining the EU 
international ‘presence’ : its ability to agree, its 
ability to act, and the extent of resources dedicated 
to support those actions. The capabilities, in this 
regard, are divided into resources, instruments, 
and cohesiveness. Gunaryadi (2006, 93) argues 
that in the Helsinki Accord, the EU preservedall 
aspects that sustain itscapabilities to act and to 
realize its ambition for global leadership. The 
EU commitment to support the Helsinki Accord 
through the Crisis Management Initiatives should 
be understood in political aspiration framework. 
Second, the EU has an ethical obligation to 
realize its commitment to develop its cooperation 
with Indonesia which have a legitimate legal 
source under international law. It can be argued 
that the EU is consistent with its grandstrategy on 
Indonesia. Although there is no special clause in 
the major documents regulating its relations with 
Indonesia to solve internal conflicts in a peaceful 
way, however, the Helsinki Accord is part of the 
main agenda, such as the EU’s support to good 
governance, local democracy, and sustainable 
management of natural resources. The EU often 
critisised human rights violations in Indonesia, 
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but it consistently support Indonesian territorial 
integrity and called for a peaceful and political 
conflict resolution in the country. Third, through 
the involvement in the Helsinki Accord, the EU 
is indirectly try to deliver message to the world, 
especially to the powerful country, such as the 
US, that conflicts can be solved peacefully rather 
than using military force (Gunaryadi, 2006, 93).
From geopol i t i ca l  and  s t ra teg ic 
considerations, Gunaryadi (2006, 96) mentions 
two main motivations : the first motivation of the 
EU involvement is that the possibility for success 
is bigger after the tsunami disaster. The warring 
parties in Aceh were also hit by the devastation. 
This condition perceived by the EU and the CMI 
as a good opportunity which could accelerate 
the peace process in Aceh. Second, by the fact 
that Acehnese are predominantly Muslim, like 
the majority Indonesians, it can be said that the 
EU was willing to portray in sympathyamong 
the Muslims and to reinforce the West-Muslim 
world’s relations andunderstanding in the 
context of economy, politics and the measures of 
combatingterrorism. Third, the successful of the 
Helsinki Accord may improve the EU’s image 
and influence in Indonesia. This can be seen 
from the statement of Commissioner for External 
Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, 
Benita Ferrero-Waldner on March 2005:
The world must not forget the terrible 
devastation the Tsunamis brought toSouth 
East Asia.... Of the €350 million...available for 
post-Tsunami reconstructionI intend to devote 
over €200 million to Indonesia.... Europe and 
South East Asia are not just major trading 
partners...two regions can deepenthis...
important relationship particularly on 
non-trade issues from the fightagainst 
terrorism, to protecting the environment 
and combating the drugstrade...how we can 
strengthen ties with Indonesia, and support 
it on its path todemocracy, stability and 
prosperity(European Commission 2005 b, 4 
March).
FINANCING THE AMM
Following the tsunami disaster in 
December 2004, Aceh become a region with 
many international presence, including the EU. 
It has taken the lead in relief effort and has given 
large contribution to humanitarian assistance 
and development aid. Since the tsunami, the EU 
and its member states have contributed up to 
1.5 billion euros. On the EU side, particularly, 
123 million euros were allocated to immediate 
humanitarian assistance to all countries affected 
by disaster and 207 million euros made available 
under the Asia and Latin America (ALA) 
program and the RRM to support the long-term 
reconstruction of Aceh.  In the Aceh peace 
process, the EU had contributed well before the 
tsunami. In December 2002, it became a co-chair 
of the Tokyo Preparatory Conference for Peace 
and Reconstruction in Aceh where it financed the 
monitoring mission chaired by the Henry Dunant 
Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue which failed 
to end the conflict (Grevi, 2005, 29). 
Furthermore, in March 2005, the EU 
mobilized up to 220,000 euro from the RRM in 
support of a project in drafting the Master Plan 
for the recovery of Aceh which involved local 
stakeholders and civil society. On April 2005, 
the EU delivered fund under the RRM, with 
a 270,000 euro ceiling to the CMI to conduct 
peace talks. On 29 July, the EU provided 30 
million euros to support the projects for the 
rehabilitation and reconstruction of the province. 
This project intended, not only to rebuilding 
houses, public infrastructures and restart the 
economy, but also to strengthening the capacity 
of the new Reconstruction Agency as well 
as the local government (Grevi, 2005, 29). 
Although, financial matters are oftenly become 
tough criticism in Brussels, the EU’s efforts 
and the AMM mandate might be regarded as 
complementary and mutually reinforcing. 
MCHALLENGES OF THE AMM
The Helsinki Accord facilitated by the EU 
through the CMI is one of the successful story 
in the peace settlement, however, it also suffered 
some challenges. Schulze (2007, 5) addresses two 
important points : first, the disparity betweenthe 
limited time to set up the mission and the 
lengthier and highly bureaucratic funding process 
in Brussels.Second, the trainingand selection of 
monitors. One of the greatest challenges is the 
financing of the AMM. When the CMI asked the 
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EU to involve in monitoring the implementation 
of the AMM, it came with different reactions. A 
positive reactions about a Europeandeployment 
in Aceh came from The General Affairs and 
External Relations Council (GAERC), while 
The Political and Security Committee(PSC) was 
halfhearted. In this case, the EU member states 
were divided. Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands, 
France, and the UK were agreed for an EU 
involvement while the rest preferred the EU to 
concentrate on areas which had already the EU 
presence, such as in Balkans and Africa. 
However, the EU Commission’s External 
Relations DirectorateGeneral continued to 
outline a proposal to finance the mission in July 
2005 through a grant to a member state. This 
proposal attracted an intense debate between the 
Commission and the Council, not only about the 
contents but also the political consequences to the 
Commission for conducting the Aceh mission. 
As a consequence, the Council Legal Service 
rejected the proposal on legal, budgetary and 
political grounds. Thus, from this reaction, it was 
obvious that the Council felt the Commission had 
been overboard from the EU chain of command. 
The process to finance the AMM was slow during 
the debate due to some member states dubious 
stance on the Aceh mission. Because of Javier 
Solana’s personal intervention, the debate over 
financing the AMM swayed in favour of EU 
deployment and financing it from the CFSP 
budget(Schulze, 2007, 5). 
Nevertheless, out of a total budget of 15 
million euro, the CFSP could only cover 9 million 
euro, the rest had to be provided by member 
states. Only seven member states contributed to 
this mission for an overall amount of 5 million 
euro. For instance, Sweden gave 4 million euro 
for logistical support. However, in this critical 
situation, the largest contribution fell upon the 
UK through the British embassy in Jakarta since 
the UK held the EU presidency at the time. 
This financial challenges forced by procedural 
and time constraints, because the EU are not 
equipped to release the fund rapidly. In addition, 
the Aceh mission was operated at very short time, 
in only 18 days. Therefore, Schulze argues that 
the institutional struggle of power inBrussels, 
the lack of consensus among member states,and 
the unconventional way of raising the money 
forthe mission, had consequences not only on the 
diplomaticlevel but also on the ground. This can 
be seen from the fact that when the assessment 
team arrived in Aceh in August2005 they had 
no money to access and no mobilephones 
that worked. Unfortunately, the AMM lacked 
money forsecretaries, offices, computers, and 
printers(Schulze, 2007, 5).
The training program for the mission was 
a challenges as well since it was not prepared 
sufficiently. Since the beginning, it only covered 
elementary issues in a three-day training 
program. It included briefs on Acehnesesociety 
and culture, the conflict history, and an overview 
of the Indonesian military functioned.There 
was also training provided on emergency 
preparednessand humanitarian operations. The 
local languages also posed significant challenges. 
There were only a small number within the 
EU team who can speak Indonesian let alone 
Acehnese language. This become more burden 
with the fact that a few members of the AMM 
were not speak English adequately and therefore 
hindered communication among the monitors 
(Schulze, 2007, 5). 
Despite the challenges along the process, 
the AMM was success in some ways. Its 
monitors and expertise contributed to made 
the implementation process of the Helsinki 
Accord easier and avoid the collapsed of the 
Aceh peace process. Due to the impartiality and 
the confidence inspired by the AMM in both 
GAM and the Indonesian military, it eventually 
smooth the way to the implementation of the 
crucial decommissioning and redeployment. 
Schulze (2007, 14) summed up five key points 
of the successful of the peace process : First, 
full commitment of GAM and the Indonesian 
government in the peace process. Without the 
consent of both parties, the peace process will 
failed since the very beginning of the talks. 
Second, the leadership and impartiality of its 
head of mission, Pieter Feith, and the mission as 
a whole. Third, the support of individual member 
states, particularly the UK, Finland, and Sweden 
during the set-up phase of the mission. Fourth, 
the quick amnesty and the committee on security 
arrangements (COSA). Fifth, by not too much 
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focusing on the human rights implementation at 
the early process, it made possible for the AMM 
to complete its mission in the light of sensitive 
context of Indonesian domestic politics. 
CONCLUSION
The EU involvement in the AMM was 
one of the successful story in the peaceful 
conflict settlement. In this mission, the EU 
has been able to show the world that it is one 
of significant actor in international politics. 
Admittedly, the EU represents uncertain image 
in international politics as if it can not be seen at 
the same level of sovereign-states. Nevertheless, 
by viewing the EU as an evolving entity which 
engaged in particular issues and by addressing 
its international presence in the context of its 
involvement in the AMM, the EU has played 
significant role as an international actor. 
Furthermore, the willingness of third 
parties in the peace process, particularly the 
Indonesian government and the GAM leadership, 
to recognize the EU as a legitimate international 
actor and the political will of some EU member 
states to participate and contribute in the AMM 
also emphasized the EU’s role as an international 
actor.  In conclusion, by viewing the EU as an 
evolving entity which engaged in particular issues 
and by addressing its international presence, it is 
argued that the EU has played significant role 
as an international actor in the context of its 
involvement in the AMM. 
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